So, imagine you had a teleportation device composed of a transmitter and a receiver, but rather than transmitting the actual atoms the transmitter would scan (and disperse) the object's current atomic makeup, send the data to the receiver, and then the receiver recompiles the object with local atoms. An analogy would be a fax machine, where only the data is transmitted, as opposed to the actual document.
The question is, if this device was used to teleport a human, and the machine was accurate enough to replicate them exactly so that the person coming out of the receiver was alive, healthy, and retained all their memories, would the person that enters the teleport be the same person that exits the teleport?
As a secondary thought, what would be the consequences of a nondestructive transmitter (i.e. your body is scanned, sent, and recomplied, but your original body is not destroyed)? Would the copy be "you"? Would the original be "you"? Both? Neither?
I'll withhold adding my opinion for the moment.
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WellThat was an awfully complicated way to describe the average sci-fi understanding of a clone lol (as opposed a genuine biological clone which would be born as a baby and go through a different upbringing at a different time). Not sure what "faith" has to do with this either.Voted for by Weydon.
This concept has come up in many sci-fi and fantasy stories, and it's an intriguing one. It would not be "you", just a copy of "you" sadly with all of your memories. It has every right a human being should have, but it does not have right to whatever is the original's. Number 2 does not own Number 1's house, job, belongings, etc which would make for a difficult integration into life perhaps, but it would have all of your experience and knowledge (and I suppose "rights" to any degrees or job experience would be the same). Much like if you faxed a contract or an autograph or an original copy of some famous literary work--the genuine article is worth more because it is the genuine article. Hopefully you weren't in love at the time, for that would be a much more painful experience for Number 2. Perhaps Number 2 would go insane with jealous and a "right" to have what Number 1 has, but since it is an exact duplicate of Number 1 only you could know for sure what it would do.
I could honestly say if I was to find out right now I was Number 2 right now I would give up all of these rights to Number 1, because it is only fair. I have only truly been around a few seconds while Number 1 did the actual deeds. But also if I found out I had a Number 2 I would feel a little obligated to help him set up shop somewhere. Of course though, if I had been around the last few years and Number 1 was doing something else, I would claim rights to whatever I had accomplished the last few years.
I find these ideas both interesting, but also fairly logical in what seems right. You should check out the movie The 6th Day with Arnold Schwarzenegger (a bit campy at times maybe, but actually pretty good). Other similar concepts I think would be artificial intelligence rights. Also the movie Inkheart, which sadly wasn't very good at all, but a somewhat similar theme is present which was pretty interesting. And surprisingly enough another Arnold movie makes the cut, Total Recall. Stupid 80's action at it's best, yet the overall idea of the plot is extremely thought provoking (even if the movie itself is just popcorn fun). I don't want to give away too many spoilers to the movies, maybe I will in a sub-post with warnings. -
Memories are retained, eh?Ah, this reminds me somehow of Hobbes' ship of Teseus. You're probably familiar with it, but if you're not, here it is in a nutshell: There is a ship in the harbor, and it must have a board on the deck replaced. The board is removed, but not destroyed. Instead it is stored in a warehouse and a new board is put in place. Now, over time, many parts of the ship require replacement, until every board and every nail and every sail are removed and replaced, and all of the pieces are stored in a warehouse. When the last board has been replaced, all of the removed pieces of the ship are reassembled and a ship is built exactly as the original.Voted for by Xelgaroth.
Which of the two is the "real" original ship? Another example akin to it is if the members of a band gradually leave and are replaced until none of the original musicians remain, then all of the old musicians regroup as a band of the same name, which is the "original" band?
Personal identity. Ugh.
I would like to think that it's fairly safe to simply conclude that the person, inasmuch as the originally transmitted person remains to exist, is NOT the same person, because that would imply the same person existing in two places. However, I know that this will be torn up one side and down the other.
I would say that mere imitation hardly implies identicalness-- that is to say, merely to make a copy of a given thing hardly makes the copy THE thing; this sounds absurd to me. It's almost like saying that the copied thing never actually existed, but we KNOW it existed, elsewise it could not have been COPIED.
Does this facsimile (I use this term instead of clone because I feel that it is more correct under the circumstances of your hypothetical situation) share the exact same thoughts as the original? What I mean is, when the new person is created, do they think exactly what the original thinks when the original thinks it? Or does it think something else? It seems to me that if it does not have the exact same thoughts, not merely exact same memories as the original, it is not the same person, for only the original person would think the particular thoughts it is thinking (this almost sounds like a tongue-twister). Think of it this way:
Jones is thinking of hot-dogs and their pertinence to the meaning of life. It is at this point that he is copied and another Jones assembled elsewhere. Facsimile Jones (let's call him Fones), however, is thinking, "My, what a strange place I find myself in!", for he has just been created. Fones is then not thinking as Jones would, for Jones is thinking of hot-dogs. Only Jones would think at that exact second the exact thought that was in his head; if you are not thinking that exact same thought, you are not Jones, but are rather nothing more than a very clever imitation of Jones, who, being a copy of his brain structure, might think very SIMILARLY to Jones, but are nevertheless NOT thinking Jones-thoughts.
I've often wondered the paradox of this facsimile "retaining all of the original's memories". He may have the same memories, but they are merely PHANTOM memories, rather like déjà vu. While he may have those memories, he is immediately and instantaneously bombarded with a new wave of new memories NOT held by Jones, whose memories currently consist of his recent reverie about hot-dogs. Fones' memories may include all those shared by Jones UP TO THE POINT OF HIS CREATION, but immediately thereafter their memories diverge.
When Fones becomes conscious he immediately reacts to different stimuli than Jones, and hence has different memories. He only has, then, this creepy sense of having lived before he lived. He mentally is aware of having just now been created, but he cannot shake off the bizarre sensation of REMEMBERING being alive prior to this. This is very different from Jones, who not only remembers living, but remembers that he remembers living. What I mean is, Jones would feel no inconsistency between remembering his life and the fact that it has been lived; his memories are consistent with the passage of time that occurred during the course of his life to date. But Fones does not have this luxury; he is trapped in a paradox of memory. He is aware of the sense of having lived for twenty years, but knows that he has only lived for twenty seconds. Aside the fact that this means they have different thoughts, and therefore are not the same person, it also means that Fones does NOT, in fact, have the same memories; it is, in truth, impossible to do so. To that end, no, they are not the same person.
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It's the same person.I'm going to disagree with both of you here and say it's the same person. Where I think both of you err is that you try to claim ownership of your atoms.Voted for by NoeL-.
I think we can all agree that we stay the same person our whole lives. However, it's not the case that we keep the same atoms our whole live. Atoms constantly come and go, but "me" stays the same.
I think what constitutes "me" is the projection of my brain. Replicate my brain, replicate "me". In a destructive teleporter, the person that goes in is exactly the same person as the one that went in. The only difference is that they're composed of different atoms. What, however, is the difference between two hydrogen atoms other than their relative location? Apart from their location, they're identical. The same goes for other elements. So when my body is recompiled, it's exactly the same as the one that was dispersed, just in a different location. Teleporting across a room is essentially no different to walking across a room.
The nondestructive facsimile scenario is where it gets interesting, and where individuality becomes a question. Following from my position above, both the original and the copy are "me". There are now two of "me", in different locations. This, however, is fundamentally at odds with the concept of individuality, which implies that there can only ever be one "me". If my bodies are identical, and my sense of "me" is identical, yet we cannot both be "me" (because we'd each have different, unique experiences post-copy), the only conclusion you can draw is that NEITHER of us are "me" - we are each new people with the memory of "me".
But this again, seems contradictory. If individuality is destroyed in a nondestructive copy, how is it retained in a destructive copy? This leads me to my final conclusion:
"Me" is retained whether the copy process is destructive or nondestructive. Where it is nondestructive, there exist two instances of "me". The notion of individuality, therefore, is false. -
Depends on your standards of identificationThere was a tribe in Africa who believed that if they had their picture taken, that their soul was let loose and they wouldn't be the same person.Voted for by Molzahn.
It's superstitious nonsense naturally, but likewise, how is teleportation any different than our natural cycle of replacing and renewing every cell of our body?
It acts like you, it is the only instance of you, so why question it unless there is an error in the process. But much like scar tissue, a defect does not change the fact that what we identify as you is still you.
Now supposing you created two of you (and borrowing from Xelagaroth's brilliant idea of two bodies with identical thoughts), and both persons are identical in thought and action (we'll blame quantum entanglement for the moment, considering that's how the science behind it is expected to work). In the same way that an entangled atom which exists in two places at once is indeed just one item, both of these "instances" of you are just one unit (weird, but interesting to think about).
Now, let's suppose that these two entangled instances slowly start to metabolize the matter around them and slowly become disentangled from each other. Which one is the real you?
In reality, neither of you is in fact you. They are just different expressions of you (they aren't the same person as who you were). Like a spotlight shining on two different textures of rocks, the light is the same, but the manner they manifest is different.
Or better yet, to use a Buddhist parable. They are like water rolling down a mountainside, collecting dust and grit on their descent into the valley. At some point of the journey, this body of water breaks into two forms of equal composition, and start becoming their own identities as their paths move away from each other and they are enriched by different experiences.
It would be like identical twins, or a mother and offspring. What would belong to one, now belongs to both. -
PotentiallyNo, the person who comes out on the other end, assuming that it was exactly replicated perfectly, could be a doppleganger, and act and be exactly like you, yet have a different consciousness.Voted for by TeChNoWC.
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NoeL-
November 19, 2009
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Weydon
November 20, 2009
NoeL-
November 20, 2009
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Why not?
If the copy is identical to the person that died making the copy, how are they different?
Xelgaroth
November 20, 2009
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Xelgaroth
November 20, 2009
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Xelgaroth
November 20, 2009
Xelgaroth
November 20, 2009
NoeL-
November 20, 2009
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NoeL-
November 20, 2009
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Bob and Copybob are different people, but are either of them Pre-copyBob? Why? Why not?
Xelgaroth
November 29, 2009
Hardly so. I would contend that any one individual thought does not comprise one's identity. Indeed, not even all of the thoughts that you HAVE thought comprise as they are your actual identity of who you are AT THIS VERY INSTANT. I would argue that the body of thoughts that you have thought, are thinking, and, though on this third one I could sway widely, will think, comprise a cohesive whole of thoughts, a cumulative whole that all make up the identity of a given person.
Consider, for instance, my aforeused Jones-Fones example. Even if we cannot objectively tell which of the two really is Jones, regardless of this fact only one of them actually IS Jones. You can say, "Well, I can't tell 'em apart, so they MIGHT AS WELL BE the same person, but you cannot say, "They are both the same person", because there really is an objective difference that makes one "Jones" and the other "Fones", as distinctly different individuals. I shall go on.
Jones was born/conceived, and from the development of his brain began a series of, if rudimentary at first, thoughts. Each thought succeeded the other as the immediate dominator of his consciousness for the moment. It was then replaced by another thought, and another, and so on. These thoughts, as well as the things he has said, heard, seen, done, et cetera, comprise his "memories". Now, no one individual thought contained in and of itself Jones' identity as a person; it is a "building block", as it were, of his identiy. Each thought is part of a cohesive whole that makes up the unique individual person Jones. Of particular supremacy, one might say, are the thoughts that Jones is thinking at this exact moment, the present. These thoughts make up his IMMEDIATE identity. No one else can think the same thought at the same time, for to do so they would have to be in the very place and very instant occupied by Jones-- inasmuch as no two objects of matter can occupy the same space at the same time, this is a logical impossibility. Therefore, Jones possesses a quality that makes him an entirely unique individual-- his own person.
As the thought currently occupying Jones' consciousness passes away and is replaced by another, it becomes part of Jones' COLLECTIVE identity. That thought becomes part of his memories, which, along with his immediately existing thought, become part of what makes Jones, well, Jones. Any interruption of this chain of thoughts does not cause Jones to cease to be a person, for he still has a collective identity made up of all of those thoughts held only by Jones, even as he sleeps. Mere inability to immediately recall that memory does not mean that he is not Jones-- only that Jones has a temporarily suspended consciousness.
Indeed, even to erase the currently existing memories of Jones-- say he has amnesia or something, is not enough to erase the individual Jones' person. For one can still "fall back on" what I mentioned earlier as his Immediate Identity: the thought that is at this very instant held by Jones and Jones alone. This distinction makes Jones a unique individual, even when his memories are removed. There are, then, if you will, two aspects of Identity: The Immediate Identity and the Collective Identity.
To this extent, no copy of Jones, merely because it has his memories, actually IS Jones, because none of them contain the exact same collective and immediate identity of Jones. Jones' thought at this moment cannot be held by anyone else at the same time; it is, as I said before, logically impossible. They therefore cannot have the same immediate identity. Neither, it follows, can they have the same collective identity, for in order to have the same, cohesive collection of thoughts and memories, they would have to have been thinking the same thing at the same time EVERY SINGLE TIME Jones has a thought, elsewise they will have a different memory. If they have a different memory, then they did not have the same immediate thought, and are therefore not the same person.
But what is the relevance, you might ask? If they cannot be distinguished, isn't it more or less irrelevant? That, I suppose, would depend on your own semantics, really. If you wish to say, "I cannot objectively tell Jones and Fones apart", then you would be correct; they have the same brain structure, and thus will think in similar ways to one another, will respond to stimuli similarly, et cetera. If you did not see which was the original and which the copy to begin with, you could not objectively determine which was which. Well and good. But you cannot objectively assert that there is no such thing as the "real" Jones merely because you cannot tell them apart; it just means that you don't know it. As above, there is very definitely a real Jones, thinking thoughts only Jones would think because only Jones was there at the time; only that one is the real Jones and the other is the copy. To that extent, it would be silly to say that they are both Jones; even if they are indistinguishable, you nevertheless know that ONE of them is the original, objectively.
NoeL-
November 29, 2009
That's an assertion I disagree with, and you'll need to back it up with something more.
"To this extent, no copy of Jones, merely because it has his memories, actually IS Jones, because none of them contain the exact same collective and immediate identity of Jones."
Let's freeze it right after the copy, before any new thoughts are thought. We have two identical bodies, two identical collective identities and two identical immediate identities. This is where I believe "Jones" as an individual is lost and replaced with "Jones1" and "Jones2". One is an original and one is a copy, but it's not Jones and Fones - they each have equal claim to the "Jones" identity. Neither of them are Jones, but they are both who Jones WAS.
"They therefore cannot have the same immediate identity."
I disagree. From the time the copy is completed (let's say it's instantaneous) to the time it takes to form a thought, they both have an identical immediate identity.
"If they have a different memory, then they did not have the same immediate thought, and are therefore not the same person."
What if it was a destructive copy? There's only one immediate identity and one continuous collective identity, so are pre-copy Jones and post-copy Jones the same person? This was my initial question.
"As above, there is very definitely a real Jones, thinking thoughts only Jones would think because only Jones was there at the time; only that one is the real Jones and the other is the copy. To that extent, it would be silly to say that they are both Jones; even if they are indistinguishable, you nevertheless know that ONE of them is the original, objectively."
Ok, you keep equating "original" with "Jones", and I think this is an unsupported assertion. Please back it up. The original has an identity stemming from Jones, the copy has an identity stemming from Jones - either one could be the "real Jones", thinking thoughts that only the real Jones could think, or perhaps, as I stated earlier, neither of them are Jones... or maybe both of them are Jones? Same person, different people.
Xelgaroth
November 30, 2009
Okay. Lemme break it down.
1. Jones is thinking thought A.
2. Thought A requires a coördination of Time, Location, and Stimulus. Stimulus is affected by location, which is affected by Time. And so on. If these three conditions are not imitated, then thought A is not being thought.
3. Hence, in order to be thinking thought A, one would need to be in the exact same place at the exact same time.
4. But this is a logical impossibility: no two particles of matter can occupy the same space at the same time.
5. Therefore, only Jones is thinking thought A.
6. If, then, only Jones is thinking thought A, then Jones is unique.
7. Now, Jones’ body and memories are copied.
8. But in order to BE Jones, Facsimile Jones—Fones—would have to be thinking the same thought at the same time—which has already been proven to be impossible.
9. Therefore, Fones CANNOT be Jones.
10. Objectively, then, Jones is Jones, and Fones is Fones, and they are not the same person, even if they are indistinguishable.
"Let's freeze it right after the copy, before any new thoughts are thought. We have two identical bodies, two identical collective identities and two identical immediate identities"
This isn't a major complaint, but you just seem to be reworking your thought experiment over and over in order to suit the argument.
Anyhow, very well; let's assume they are indeed knocked unconscious and frozen. But realise that your thought experiment gradually grows more absurd. Assuming that we DO knock Jones unconscious and then we DO copy him non-destructively and then we DO freeze them before they regain consciousness, I suppose that they could be construed to be the "same" person. But it's sort of an irrelevant detail if both of them are frozen and unconscious; two tomatoes may be the same tomato, but if the tomatoes are dead, does it really matter? If they were both conscious, then the fact that they are the same person would have practical and important implications: how would their possessions be divided between them? How would you deal with the emotional stress with respect to family members and/or spouses? These and others are important questions-- if Jones and Fones/NotJones/BothJoneses are CONSCIOUS. If they're both frozen, then such questions become purely academic, do they not? I'm not trying to avoid answering the point, I'm just trying to see the practical relevance if you have an individual who is unconscious and static and then copy him. You've proved a point, I guess, that they are, for all intents and purposes, the same person, but the moment you flick the "on" switch back on, the copy ceases to be Jones and Jones continues to be Jones as if he were uninterrupted. So why does it matter?
"Ok, you keep equating 'original' with 'Jones', and I think this is an unsupported assertion."
Because I am considering Time, as well. As I said before, the thoughts that Jones HAS thought, IS thinking, and, the third one, WILL think all comprise a cohesive whole, a total unit that make up the identity "Jones". The original is thinking a thought, is copied, reanimated, and continues along. The various thoughts that Jones was going to think shall continue uninterrupted. Now, unfortunately, I am running once again into self-articulation problems. Jones WILL think, following thought A, thoughts B, F, and R. Fones, however, aside from not thinking thought A (because he's not in the same place at the same time), WILL think thoughts D, L, and Q. His future thoughts must also be identical in order for him to be the same person as Jones.
Wait a minute, you're going to say, how do you KNOW that Jones will be thinking thoughts B, F, and R in the future? I do not, but it's a simple matter, really. I know that Jones WILL be thinking certain thoughts in the future. It is understood that if Fones does not continue to be in the exact same place thinking the exact same thoughts every single time, not just NOW, but every other thought in the future, then he is not/will not be Jones. I understand that you're saying that when they are both awakened, they are starting from the same point-- that is, from the last moment Jones recalls being conscious-- but only Jones WILL think the thoughts that he is going to think. Fones, however, will think only the thoughts that HE is going to think, and they are different from Jones'.
There are several holes I can perceive in this idea. Firstly, I suppose that it sort of presupposes the idea of a static time. I do not mean "destiny" in any abstract sense of the word, but merely that there are certain things that only the original Jones is going to think. Only the original. Those thoughts comprise the original, actual Jones thoughts. The facsimile might be said to be thinking "what if?" Jones thoughts, as in "alternate" Jones thoughts, but not ACTUAL ones, for only the original Jones will think the thoughts that he will think. If the copy does not do this as well, then it is not Jones.
Now, as for the destructive copy, which indeed was, as you said, your original question, I suppose that in light of what I have been saying here, it would be silly for me to assert that the post-destructive-copy Jones is the same person, because Jones, with all of his past thoughts, immediate thoughts, and, therefore, future thoughts, destroyed, he would not be the same person-- unless, arguably, reassembled Jones will think the same thoughts that pre-destruction Jones would have thought. The trouble here, however, is that we cannot KNOW that he will, because we cannot see what pre-destruction Jones would have thought. In this particular instance, he is essentially the same, but we cannot KNOW that he is the same, because we do not know if his future thoughts will be identical to those that pre-destruction Jones would have thought. Does that make sense? I'm not sure it does.
NoeL-
November 30, 2009
2. Thought A requires a coördination of Time, Location, and Stimulus. Stimulus is affected by location, which is affected by Time. And so on. If these three conditions are not imitated, then thought A is not being thought.
3. Hence, in order to be thinking thought A, one would need to be in the exact same place at the exact same time.
4. But this is a logical impossibility: no two particles of matter can occupy the same space at the same time."
Yes, you've established that Jones and Fones are different people. You have NOT established that pre-copy Jones and Fones are different people, or that pre-copy Jones and post-copy Jones are the SAME people.
"This isn't a major complaint, but you just seem to be reworking your thought experiment over and over in order to suit the argument."
Not at all, it's exactly the same thought experiment, I'm just focusing on a specific aspect of it.
"THEN you say "Well, let's FREEZE them after we've knocked them unconscious and copied them.""
LOL! I didn't mean LITERALLY freeze them, I meant hypothetically freeze time at that moment. XD
"You've proved a point, I guess, that they are, for all intents and purposes, the same person, but the moment you flick the "on" switch back on, the copy ceases to be Jones and Jones continues to be Jones as if he were uninterrupted. So why does it matter?"
Why is Jones Jones and Fones NOT Jones? Again, this is something you keep repeating without justifying. You agree that if they're frozen they are BOTH Jones, so what is it that makes one continue to be Jones and one to cease being Jones?
"Jones WILL think, following thought A, thoughts B, F, and R. Fones, however, aside from not thinking thought A (because he's not in the same place at the same time), WILL think thoughts D, L, and Q. His future thoughts must also be identical in order for him to be the same person as Jones."
I understand that they're different people, you don't need to keep rearticulating yourself on that matter. What I'm asking is WHY the original is still "Jones" (i.e. the guy that existed pre-copy) and why the copy is NOT Jones. I understand that they can't both be the same person because they'll have different thoughts, but you're not giving any reason to suggest one is still Jones and the other is not Jones.
"I understand that you're saying that when they are both awakened, they are starting from the same point-- that is, from the last moment Jones recalls being conscious-- but only Jones WILL think the thoughts that he is going to think."
This could only vaguely work if the universe is deterministic, and even then it still fails because you're relying on the truth of the thing you're trying to prove. It's circular reasoning.
Let's say the Jones > Jones thought process goes as follows:
A B C * D E F (where the * is the copy event)
Jones > Fones goes like this:
A B C * X Y Z
Now you are unjustly asserting that the thought process of "Jones" is "A B C D E F", therefore Jones > Jones is the real Jones because his thought process matches. What if the thought process of "Jones" is "A B C X Y Z"? Then Jones > Fones is the real Jones. Again, you're not providing any justification for determining whether the REAL Jones is "A B C D E F" or "A B C X Y Z".
Personally, I would map the thoughts as:
Real Jones
A B C
Jones > Jones
A B C D1 E1 F1
Jones > Fones
A B C D2 E2 F2
"I do not mean "destiny" in any abstract sense of the word, but merely that there are certain things that only the original Jones is going to think. Only the original. Those thoughts comprise the original, actual Jones thoughts. The facsimile might be said to be thinking "what if?" Jones thoughts, as in "alternate" Jones thoughts, but not ACTUAL ones, for only the original Jones will think the thoughts that he will think. If the copy does not do this as well, then it is not Jones."
And you have provided no justification that "original Jones" = "Jones". You just keep asserting it.
"Now, as for the destructive copy, which indeed was, as you said, your original question, I suppose that in light of what I have been saying here, it would be silly for me to assert that the post-destructive-copy Jones is the same person, because Jones, with all of his past thoughts, immediate thoughts, and, therefore, future thoughts, destroyed, he would not be the same person-- unless, arguably, reassembled Jones will think the same thoughts that pre-destruction Jones would have thought. The trouble here, however, is that we cannot KNOW that he will, because we cannot see what pre-destruction Jones would have thought. In this particular instance, he is essentially the same, but we cannot KNOW that he is the same, because we do not know if his future thoughts will be identical to those that pre-destruction Jones would have thought. Does that make sense? I'm not sure it does."
It doesn't make sense because you're trying to have your cake and eat it to. You're asserting the need for some kind of destiny and a static sequence of thought processes for Jones AND that that process is interupted by the copy. It doesn't make sense at all, because if Jones is destroyed in the copy then there ARE NO FUTURE THOUGHTS! He's gone! You're essentially assuming an alternate reality where Jones isn't copied and saying that THAT is the real Jones, and the Jones that exists in THIS reality ISN'T Jones because his thought sequence doesn't match alternate-reality-Jones. Can you see the absurdity? Maybe the REAL Xelgaroth was hit in the head with a softball and lost his sight back in 1999, and you are the fake Xelgaroth because you can still see?
Xelgaroth
December 1, 2009
I think you misread my last paragraph, because that's precisely what I was trying to say. Perhaps I didn't articulate myself very well. I UNDERSTAND that we canNOT know post-copy Jones to be the same Jones as before, because pre-copy Jones has been DESTROYED; his future thoughts do not exist, and therefore cannot be known. To this extent, we could never know. Post-copy Jones is therefore a different person.
"This could only vaguely work if the universe is deterministic, and even then it still fails because you're relying on the truth of the thing you're trying to prove. It's circular reasoning."
I apologize, but your array of letters and numbers, though I hate to admit it, simply went over my head. It was simply too many letters in one place for me to keep track of and understand. (I once read a philosopher trying to prove the illogicality of the trinity who did a lot of that number/letter-crunching, and it eventually became so ridiculous that it became a mark against him
Anyway, what I am saying is that the original Jones, who prior to the copy is the ONLY Jones in existence, and is therefore Jones, has certain thoughts that he will think. These future thoughts as well as past and future thoughts comprise his identity. HE is the ONLY one who will think these thoughts. He is therefore the ONLY person who can possibly BE Jones. Therefore, the original is Jones. Here's my thinking:
1. Original Jones, prior to the copy, is Jones.
2. Jones has thought A, is thinking B, and will think C.
3. Only Jones will think C.
4. Therefore, only the original is Jones. Original Jones = Jones.
I guess I am arguably assuming that Jones will in fact think C, but C is no particular thought; it is merely A thought. I am asserting that original Jones is Jones, and that Jones and Jones alone shall be the thinker of that particular thought when he thinks it. I am assuming that Jones WILL in fact be thinking a thought; I'm presuming that he does not die. If Original Jones before the copy is Jones, and Jones will think a given thought, and no one else other than Original Jones (who is Jones) will think that thought, then any copy thereafter made cannot possibly be Jones because only the original Jones will think that thought, meaning that only original Jones is Jones. Original Jones = Jones. That is the logic upon which I assert this.
NoeL-
December 2, 2009
You're materialising "Jones" though, and whilst Jones is composed of atoms, that composition of atoms is not Jones. Our atomic structure is not static from conception to death, it's in constant flux - giving and taking atoms. So whilst Jones' CURRENT atomic composition is dispersed, I don't agree that "Jones" is DESTROYED. His future thoughts are still able to occur after his body is reassembled.
"I apologize, but your array of letters and numbers, though I hate to admit it, simply went over my head."
Sorry, I'm a programmer
"Anyway, what I am saying is that the original Jones, who prior to the copy is the ONLY Jones in existence, and is therefore Jones, has certain thoughts that he will think. These future thoughts as well as past and future thoughts comprise his identity. HE is the ONLY one who will think these thoughts. He is therefore the ONLY person who can possibly BE Jones. Therefore, the original is Jones.
3. Only Jones will think C.
4. Therefore, only the original is Jones. Original Jones = Jones."
Conclusion doesn't follow. What if Fones thinks C, and post-copy Jones thinks D? Then Fones is "Jones", and post-copy Jones is not. You keep saying that original = Jones without saying why it necessisarily is so. You're using circular reasoning. You're saying he can't think C because he's not Jones, and is not Jones because he can't think C.
"I guess I am arguably assuming that Jones will in fact think C, but C is no particular thought; it is merely A thought. I am asserting that original Jones is Jones, and that Jones and Jones alone shall be the thinker of that particular thought when he thinks it."
Then all you're proving is that Jones and post-copy Jones are the same person. Fones will also think a thought C, which is no particular thought, so pre-copy Jones and Fones are also the same person, by your reasoning.
"If Original Jones before the copy is Jones, and Jones will think a given thought, and no one else other than Original Jones (who is Jones) will think that thought, then any copy thereafter made cannot possibly be Jones because only the original Jones will think that thought, meaning that only original Jones is Jones. Original Jones = Jones."
Circular reasoning, as stated above. It only works out that Original Jones is Jones because that was one of your premises! Watch how I prove Fones is Jones by simply replacing "Original Jones" with "Fones":
If Fones before the copy is Jones, and Jones will think a given thought, and no one else other than Fones (who is Jones) will think that thought, then any copy thereafter made cannot possibly be Jones because only Fones will think that thought, meaning that only Fones is Jones. Fones = Jones.
"That is the logic upon which I assert this."
You need to work on your logic
Xelgaroth
December 2, 2009
Now. Pre-Copy Jones (Or "original Jones", however you wanna call him; call him Fluffy for all I care) has thought certain thoughts. He is thinking certain thoughts. He also, assuming he does not die, WILL think particular thoughts. Obviously, neither I nor Jones knows what those thoughts will be, but we know that if he continues as he is, he shall be thinking some thought at some point. Jones will be thinking thought C.
I have already at length and ad nauseum established that in order to be the same person, the facsimile of Jones must think the exact same thoughts, and must be going to think the same thoughts. Every time Jones thinks about flying cats, Fones thinks about flying cats. Jones, let's say, is going to think at 10:43 AM on December 14, 2034 about alligators that stand on one leg and whistle to the tune of "Old Susanna" whilst riding a unicycle. In order to be Jones, or even in order to simply be the same person as whoever the hell Jones became after being copied, he must also think of whistling monoped unicycling alligators at 10:43AM on Dec 14, 2034. I know, I KNOW I've already established this, and you understand my point. But I am reiterating it for my next point.
We have established that Original Jones is just Jones before he's been copied. Prior to the copy event, Original Jones = Jones. No other Joneses exist to dispute the identity of original Jones as being the only Jones. Whether he be interrupted for any length of time during or even after the copy event or not, we know that if Jones does not die, he's going to think a particular thought, which I will call Thought C. The nature of this thought is unknown, but we know that it is a particular thought that only the original Jones will think. In conjunction with past and present thoughts, this and other future thoughts of Original/Precopy Jones comprise the identity to which we refer as "Jones". No copy hereafter made will share the same future thoughts as this "Jones". They therefore cannot possibly be Jones. Only the original Jones, hence, is Jones. I do not see how I am presupposing the truth I am trying to prove. If we acknowledge that before the copy no other Joneses exist, then it follows that original Jones is Jones. Only the Jones who already existed prior to the copy event is Jones, because he, and he alone, had/s or will have the particular thoughts he is having or will think. Original Jones, therefore, is Jones, even after the copy event, for he will still be the only one to think the thoughts he is going to think. The thoughts he was going to think before being copied are not going to change, for if they change, then he never really was going to think them in the first place, because any so-called future event, if it be prevented or altered, thereby immediately loses its nature of futurity and therefore never really would have happened in the first place.
Jones was going to think thought C before he was copied. Precopy Jones is still going to think thought C after being copied. This fact of being the one who is going to think C is what defines him as the only one with a claim to the identity "Jones".
NoeL-
December 2, 2009
Sorry, thought you were talking about original Jones as opposed to copy Jones.
From now on, let's refer to the three Joneses as "Jones" (pre-copy), "Jones1" (the post-copy original), and "Jones2" (the post-copy copy). Happy with that?
"Obviously, neither I nor Jones knows what those thoughts will be, but we know that if he continues as he is, he shall be thinking some thought at some point. Jones will be thinking thought C."
What's stopping Jones from having the future thoughts of BOTH Jones1 and Jones2? If he indeed DOES have future thoughts, then they need a source. How are you determining whether that source is Jones1, Jones2, both, or someone else entirely? You probably think that having two sets of future thoughts is contradictory because you can't think two thoughts at the same time, so the future thoughts couldn't exist in the present. It's not contradictory, however, because when the time comes that those thoughts are thunk there are TWO Jonses, so Jones can think TWO thoughts simultaneously.
"Only the original Jones, hence, is Jones. I do not see how I am presupposing the truth I am trying to prove."
So neither Jones1 or Jones2 are Jones? Is that what you're trying to say? It seems at odds with what you've been saying, unless I've just been misunderstanding you. It gets confusing when "Original Jones" and "original Jones" are referring to different things.
"Original Jones, therefore, is Jones, even after the copy event, for he will still be the only one to think the thoughts he is going to think. The thoughts he was going to think before being copied are not going to change, for if they change, then he never really was going to think them in the first place, because any so-called future event, if it be prevented or altered, thereby immediately loses its nature of futurity and therefore never really would have happened in the first place."
Now I'm confused. So Jones exists because he has future thoughts, but neither Jones1 or Jones2 are Jones because only Jones can be Jones? So what happened to Jones? Where do his future thoughts come from?
"Jones was going to think thought C before he was copied. Precopy Jones is still going to think thought C after being copied. This fact of being the one who is going to think C is what defines him as the only one with a claim to the identity "Jones".
So "where" does Jones think C?
Xelgaroth
December 2, 2009
Very well. I think the majority of our problems here are wording and semantics-driven.
But understand that I am taking Jones and Jones1 to be the SAME PERSON. Why? Because the past, present, AND future thoughts of Jones and Jones1 are identical. Jones has thought A, is thinking B, and will think C. Jones1 has thought A, is thinking B, and will think C. Hence he is the same person. Therefore, Jones1 is Jones—the original is Jones.
“What's stopping Jones from having the future thoughts of BOTH Jones1 and Jones2? If he indeed DOES have future thoughts, then they need a source. How are you determining whether that source is Jones1, Jones2, both, or someone else entirely? You probably think that having two sets of future thoughts is contradictory because you can't think two thoughts at the same time, so the future thoughts couldn't exist in the present. It's not contradictory, however, because when the time comes that those thoughts are thunk there are TWO Jonses, so Jones can think TWO thoughts simultaneously.”
This sounds ridiculous to me. Even if I acknowledge that Jones1 and Jones2 were the same person (which I have not, and still do not), it’s ridiculous to say that “Jones” is thinking two thoughts simultaneously, or, at least, it’s sort of going down the semantic rabbit-hole, if you will. If they’re the same person, then yeah, I guess you COULD say that he is thinking two thoughts at once. But these thoughts are not occurring simultaneously in the same mind—two different thoughts occurring in two separate places= two different persons. I’ve already said this. In order for Jones1 and Jones2 to be the same person, they’d have to both think identically. But if Jones1 is thinking A and Jones2 is thinking B, then they’re not the same person. What’s stopping Jones from having future thoughts of both Jones1 and Jones2 is that Jones does not have two minds; he can only think one future thought, but not both. You seem to be implying that one mind would (Jones) do the thinking of two (Jones1 & Jones2).
“So neither Jones1 or Jones2 are Jones? Is that what you're trying to say? It seems at odds with what you've been saying, unless I've just been misunderstanding you. It gets confusing when "Original Jones" and "original Jones" are referring to different things.”
No. Jones1 is Jones. Jones2 is just someone else who happens to think similarly to Jones. But Jones1 is the same person as Jones, inasmuch as he has identical future thoughts to Jones. I think either I misspoke at some point, or you misunderstood. I’m not sure about that bit with “Original” and “original”. My lack of capitalization on some of the “original”s was merely due to laziness, not an attempt to differentiate anything.
“Now I'm confused. So Jones exists because he has future thoughts, but neither Jones1 or Jones2 are Jones because only Jones can be Jones? So what happened to Jones? Where do his future thoughts come from?”
Jones1 is Jones.
Jones has thought thought A.
Jones is thinking thought B.
Jones will think thought C.
Jones is now copied.
After the copy, post-copy original Jones—Jones1, has thought A.
Jones1 is thinking thought B.
Jones will think thought C.
The past, present, and future thoughts of Jones1 are identical to Jones.
Therefore, Jones1 = Jones.
Jones2 has thought thought A.
Jones2 is thinking thought D.
Jones2 will think thought E.
The present and future thoughts are not identical to Jones/Jones1.
Therefore Jones2 =/= Jones/Jones1.
“So ‘where’ does Jones think C?”
I’m not sure I understand your question. It doesn’t matter exactly where Jones thinks C (that is, a given future-thought); the point is that it is a particular thought that he will think in a particular location at a particular time in response to a particular stimulus. To be Jones, one would need to have this thought at the same time, in the same place, or they are not Jones. Inasmuch as Jones1 has identical thoughts to Jones from past, to present, to future, he is therefore Jones. Jones2 does not share this quality, and is therefore someone else, but certainly not Jones/Jones1.
NoeL-
December 3, 2009
And as I've said, over and over and over again, you're providing nothing to support this claim, and are using circular reasoning. You are doing nothing to show that:
a ) Jones1 WILL think Jones' C thought.
b ) Jones2 WON'T think Jones' C thought, or
c ) That Jones even HAS a C thought.
"If they’re the same person, then yeah, I guess you COULD say that he is thinking two thoughts at once. But these thoughts are not occurring simultaneously in the same mind—two different thoughts occurring in two separate places= two different persons. I’ve already said this. In order for Jones1 and Jones2 to be the same person, they’d have to both think identically."
I know, and I've already agreed with you that Jones1 and Jones2 are DIFFERENT people. Here's how I see it:
Jones1 is Jones.
Jones2 is Jones.
Jones is Jones1 AND Jones2.
But Jones1 IS NOT Jones2.
Jones can have two future thoughts, because there are two Joneses in the future. Jones1 cannot have two future thoughts, because there is only one Jones1 (unless he gets copied again). Jones1 and Jones2 cannot share thoughts, because they are different people.
"What’s stopping Jones from having future thoughts of both Jones1 and Jones2 is that Jones does not have two minds; he can only think one future thought, but not both."
After Jones becomes Jones1 and Jones2, Jones DOES have two minds, and so CAN think both. Neither mind is aware of the other, however, so each acts as it's own unique mind. You're saying he can't think FUTURE thoughts because of his condition in the PRESENT. What you're not realising is that his condition is DIFFERENT in the future.
"You seem to be implying that one mind would (Jones) do the thinking of two (Jones1 & Jones2)."
No. I'm saying Jones would do the thinking of Jones1 and Jones2, but not until he has two minds, i.e. those of Jones1 and Jones2. Pre-copy Jones can only think one thought at a time, but post-copy Jones has two minds, and so can think two. It's because Jones1 has a mind, and Jones2 has a mind, and both Jones1 and Jones2 are Jones, so Jones has two minds, in two bodies, that are different people TO EACH OTHER but are both the SAME person that Jones was (i.e. pre-copy Jones). The concept of individuality - that exactly one person can only have exactly one mind - is falsified in this scenario.
"Jones1 is Jones. Jones2 is just someone else who happens to think similarly to Jones. But Jones1 is the same person as Jones, inasmuch as he has identical future thoughts to Jones."
Prove it. You've asserted it a thousand times, now prove it.
"The past, present, and future thoughts of Jones1 are identical to Jones."
Prove it!
"Inasmuch as Jones1 has identical thoughts to Jones from past, to present, to future, he is therefore Jones. Jones2 does not share this quality, and is therefore someone else, but certainly not Jones/Jones1."
Prove it, prove it, prove it!
Xelgaroth
December 3, 2009
This is getting wearisome.
Meanwhile, Jones2, the actual copy himself, thinks something different. I realise you understand Jones2 and Jones1 to be different people, but Jones1 is Jones. You've asserted this, you say, without proof. I apologize, it just seems plain to me, and I am really not sure how to put it more concisely than I did above: Jones1 is just the original Jones after the copy. Nothing happened to his brain to cause his thoughts to be any different from before he was copied-- when he was Jones. So his thoughts did not change; therefore they are the same; therefore he is Jones.
NoeL-
December 3, 2009
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Good question. I agree that it is... not self-evident, but coherant. I don't believe his thoughts WOULD change, but I also believe his thoughts wouldn't change between Jones and Jones2 either.
"Meanwhile, Jones2, the actual copy himself, thinks something different."
This I disagree with. He thinks something different to Jones1, but does not necessarily think something different to Jones' future thought.Like I said, I maintain that Jones indeed has two simultaneous future thoughts - one for each post-copy Jones. You have to prove that Jones is EXCLUSIVELY Jones1 before you can say Jones2 isn't Jones. If you can't do it, then concede
Let's assume for the moment that Jones1 is Jones, and Jones2 is NOT Jones. It would therefore follow that in a destructive copy, the post-copy is a different person to the pre-copy. Why? You've argued that the person is DESTROYED in the atomic disruption - something I reject on the basis of our already constant atomic flux. You've argued that the copy would have some undefined "paradox of memory" that you've yet to expand on. So far I remain uncinvinced that the post-copy is a different person to the pre-copy.
If we go by your deterministic thought process, I assume this would mean that pre-copy has no future thoughts after the copy process? Why are the post-copy's future thoughts not the pre-copy's?
February 27
He said that it is so, because they are in different circumstances at different times.
NoeL-
February 27
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February 27
I think he meant that C and D are variables.
In algebra you don't say that x "could" be y, simply because it's written differently.
As letters can replace numbers, I think he uses letter in the same way to replace thoughts.
NoeL-
February 27
The problem is that he never assigned any value to thought C - it was just the post-copy thought of Jones, whatever that may be. He then claimed that Jones1's thought C was equal to Jones' thought C (which I agree), but then claimed Jones2's thought C was NOT equal to Jones's thought C because Jones1's thought C and Jones2's thought C are not equal.
But why can't Jones2's thought C be equal to Jones's thought C? Since there is no value given for C, it's just as likely that Jones2's thought C is equal to Jones's thought C. According to Xelgaroth, this would mean that Jones1 IS NOT Jones, because Jones1's thought C is different to Jones2's thought C, which is equal to Jones's thought C. It's a paradox.
The way I get around this is to say that BOTH Jones1 and Jones2's thought C are equal to Jones's thought C, but are clearly not equal to each other. How can this be? Because Jones has TWO thought C's - one for each of his future identities, Jones1 and Jones2. Xelgaroth makes the error of assuming that in a future with two Jones there will only be one thought.
Xelgaroth
February 27
What I am saying is that nothing physiologically changed the material of Jones to Jones1. We established that the thoughts of Jones1 are identical to those of Jones. What I am saying is that this is so because nothing occurred to his brain in the time before or after the copy process. Now, if you understand that only one event will manifest itself in reality, and you are given that Jones will think C, then it follows that only C shall manifest in Jones’ brain, in reality.
1. Only one event manifests itself in reality.
2. Jones will think C.
3. Therefore, the event of thought C is the only event that could ever manifest in reality.
Then,
1. Jones1’s thoughts are identical to those of Jones.
2. Therefore, Jones1 will think thought C, and it is the only event that could manifest itself in reality in Jones1’s brain.
The differences lies in the fact that Jones2 shall not think C; we have already established that Jones2 will think differently from Jones1, and Jones1 will think thought C, so it follows that Jones2 will NOT think C, thus making his thoughts NOT identical to Jones1 and therefore neither Jones’, therefore Jones1 is identical to Jones whilst Jones2 is not:
J
O
N (Shall think C)
E
S
__(Copy)
J O N E S 2 (Shall NOT think C)
J
O
N (Shall think C)
E
S
1
Only the one that shall think C is identical to Jones, because they have identical future thoughts. Jones1 shall think C, therefore he is identical to Jones. Jones2 will not, and is therefore not identical to Jones.
NoeL-
February 27
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Yes Xelgaroth, I COMPLETELY understand your argument, but I disagree. I believe that Jones has TWO "thought C"s - one for each instance of post-copy Jones. Your whole line of reasoning fails because you're asserting that in a time where two "Jones"es exist there will only be one "Jones" thought.
Secondly, your argument leads to a paradox. You argue that if Jones1 thinks Jones' C then Jones1 is Jones, and since Jones1 is not Jones2, Jones2 cannot be Jones. The paradox is that you offer no direct reason for why Jones2's thought C does not equal Jones' (by which I mean you cannot show it to be the case without first positing Jones1 as the owner). You have not demonstrated that the thought process of Jones will NOT continue after Jones is reassembled as Jones2. In a destructive copy Jones' thought C can only manifest in Jones2, as there is no Jones1, and so "Jones" flows seemlessly from Jones to Jones2, with only one thought at any given time. If this is the case, and in a destructive copy Jones2 = Jones, then we can say that Jones2 would ALSO equal Jones in a nondestructive copy, because the circumstances of Jones2 are identical in either. So if Jones2 = Jones, and Jones1 =/= Jones2, then Jones1 cannot be Jones. Hence, a paradox.
To me the solution appears to be very simple, despite its counter-intuitiveness. After the copy there are two "Jones"es, and thus two thought Cs.
February 27
NoeL-
February 27
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February 27
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December 11, 2009
oh really
what if before I was duplicated I barrowed 5 dollars from you.do both of me owe you 5 dollars?
if we are both me than we do. both of us should give you 5 dollars. you would recive 10 dollars but only have a right to five dollars. and if we each pay 2.50 then we aren't paying our full dept because we didn't barrow 2.50 we barrowed 5.
like wise if I stole your car before duplicaton should we both be convicted of that crime? even though only one of me did it?
NoeL-
February 27
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Given that you are both the same person, any money contributed from either of you will satisfy the dept. If one pays 5 and the other pays zero, the dept is payed back. If you each pay 2.50 the dept is payed back, as you each payed half of your own dept, equalling the whole of your dept.
Molzahn
2 days ago
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Though, I'm curious with you disagree with, you tend to bring up good points
Molzahn
2 days ago
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Though, I'm curious with you disagree with, you tend to bring up good points
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