If we have the ability to question whether or not we have free will, then we do indeed have free will. Though, free will is limited and at times may seem determined. There are limitations like the laws of nature and our own societal laws and rules. Determinism states that human actions are determined by the laws of nature. Our actions are very much influenced by the laws of nature, but also by society and its wants and needs. Thus, the laws of nature can not determine our every action alone.

We can definitely be held responsible for our actions. If our actions break a societal law, then there are usually predetermined consequences to endure. With predetermined consequences to our knowledge, any law-breaking action would be a risk. Risk-taking is exercising free will.

Scientists claim that if they were there and were able to witness the beginning of the universe, and know _all_ the conditions to which each and every atom exploded outwards, they would be able to predict the exact path that atom would take for the rest of its existance through spacetime. This seems pretty radical, but it's a proven mathematical truth. Since we're no exception to the next lump of atoms, we as people are also included in this rule. Does this then mean our whole lives are predestined - part of some universal scheme, some might call "God's plan"? Does it disallow us to have freewill?

There is a belief - 'Liberatarianism' which, whilst agreeing we may physically follow the predestined path, because we are conscious our minds or souls are outside it, part of something immaterial outside of the physical universe, that can override physical law.

For those who see merit in both the argument that our future is an inevitable consequence of the past and that we make genuine choices in our lives.

One influential contemporary defense of compatibilism is Daniel Dennett's. In his 1984 book Elbow Room, as well as in several important papers, including “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want,” (1981c) and “Mechanism and Responsibility” (1973), Dennett advances compatibilism by drawing upon important developments in the philosophy of mind.

This is one of those things where both side represents *a* truth but not *the* truth. What determines our fate are the constraints of our enviroment or circumstance. Initially in life we have little chance to shape that but our ability to do so grows with age.

We can determine our own lives but often not in circumstances of our choosing. For example, you might want to go down to the local shop and buy a Mars Bar; but if somebody buys the last Mars before you arrive the option of buying at that shop no longer exists; of course you can shop elsewhere but your choice has been changed by circumstances beyond your control.

Also, things like developed personality traits inhibit our free will.

Our lives are ultimately controlled by free will. There is a chance that perhaps i think this because it was determined i would, but my reality consists of now. I have the choice to walk out the door right now for the sake of excersizing my will, or i could just as easily go to bed. As petty as the choice may be, it could be the biggest choice i ever made in my life. The sport of boxing is a perfect example of free will in doing. Determinism is flawed for various reasons. Firstly, it takes a leap of faith to think that this world is determined, since i know of no one that has ever been able to determine a thing one thing that was going to happen. However, people make choices everyday. This isn't sure proof that determinism isn't the correct mode of logic, but i think free will is more evident in our lives regardless if in reality it is all determined. The difference between determinism and metaphysical libertarianism goes deeper than simply our ideas about the what is determined and what isn't. It is our basic understanding of what life is in general. If you feel that you are no different and are just the elements you are, than i suppose it would be easier to see free will is an illusion since free will cannot be calculated or measured under any circumstances. However, if you think there is more to your life, even if you aren't religious or don't necessarily understand what it is that separates you from the rocks and waters, than free will is going to seem more real to you. Furthermore, determinism cannot be lived out in honesty. This yet again cannot prove that it isn't true though i think this point has merrit against it. A determinist will often speak of the illusion of free will. They speak of it as though they believe in free will, but in the back of their minds know that all they do is basically beyond their control. I find this concept very self contradicting. Someone can never be honest with themselves in a state of self contradiction. You can't believe two things at once. So, regardless once again if determinism is right-(like most metaphysical problems it cannot be proven or disproven absolutely)-it is certainly a concept that cannot be lived out in honesty. However, a believer in free will can live their life in honesty. Free will does not exist in the future, or the past. The past is the only determined thing, and the future does not exist until it is present. Free will is now. For instance, an earlier compatiblist opinion made the example of going to a candy store to get a Mars Bar. The idea that they would get and could control that Mars Bar is an illusion, but the act of going there, each step at a time was all free will. Once they found that the last Mars Bar was gone, if they where willed to, they could also continue on the quest for what they wanted. Free will is in the present and is what makes all goals possible. Free will is not the goal itself.

Everything is determined in fact, but that implies that someone "knows" what is going on. It's possible but nobody does.

From a subjective perspective, we need the illusion of believing that there is some "I" making a decision, otherwise we could risk just "going with the flow" and making excuses for your inactions and becoming a miserable piece of s---.

I actually wrote an essay about this, so here it is.
I am engaging with a work by Baron D'Holbach in which he claims that all human actions are determined absolutely - hard determinism - with specific reference to Socrates, who he claims displayed no free will when he chose to remain in prison and die rather than escapr to Exile. The view I put forward is that much in the world is determined, but there is a genuine sponaneity as well.

I believe that Socrates freely chose to remain in prison and Baron d’Holbach’s argument to the contrary strikes me as unsatisfactory. The reasons for my dissatisfaction are threefold, firstly the argument strips Socrates of his dignity and presents us with a helpless man unable to save himself, (1) this objection is based on moral and aesthetic judgement, but I believe it is valid – it seems absurd to speak, for example, of heroes as slaves to bravery. My second objection to Holbach’s argument is that it contains hidden premises which posit the ‘self’ as a necessarily powerless observer and free will as random behaviour thus begging the question, I will attempt more satisfactory definitions based on evidence. My third argument is against deterministic theory in general: I will attempt to show that the theory has no positive outcomes and that, even if we could prove it to be true, it would be irrelevant to our lives.

Before I begin my arguments I should define what I mean by ‘free-will’: I am not advocating physical indeterminacy - which defeats any chance of human freedom - neither am I advocating a strict mind/body dualism.
The position I advocate is similar to Richard Taylor’s theory of agent causation and I accept that the mind/body unity (‘bind’?) that I will attempt to describe “is strange indeed, if not positively mysterious.”(2)
What I will argue is that physical determinism does not absolutely control the actions of thinking subjects (as opposed to objects such as planets) but influences and restricts the choices they can make.

My first objection to Holbach’s argument on the grounds that it eliminates human dignity and morality does not solely apply to Socrates but can be extended to all human action, particularly those considered brave and virtuous or cowardly and evil. Absolute physical determinism eschews all concept of responsibility and, therefore, any value-difference between virtue/vice, cowardice/bravery or intelligence/stupidity. Holbach makes a moral judgement on societies which “chastise, in the lower orders, those excesses which they respect in the higher; and…have the injustice to condemn those in the penalty of death, whom public prejudices…have rendered criminal”(3) (my italics). I object that Holbach is in no position to make this condemnation: it is intellectually hypocritical because, by his own logic, to assign blame to human action is senseless.(4) Holbach’s pride when he speaks of his proofs as being “clear to unprejudiced minds,” (5) is also hypocritical because absolute physical determinism denies any value-difference between a prejudiced and unprejudiced mind: as they both arise necessarily the difference between them is as that between a rock rolling and a rock lying still – likewise for the difference between true and false statements. I submit that since Holbach cannot let go of the basic idea that some things are better than others and thus refuses to follow his own logic, hard determinism leads to conclusions which are difficult, if not impossible, to accept.

My second argument concerns both what the word ‘self’ means and what it signifies to say that this ‘self’ has a ‘will’ that is either free or determined. The concept of ‘self’ in Holbach’s argument is a powerless entity: “his organization does innowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those who cause him to contract them…” (6) If we accept Holbach’s definition of the ‘self’ then Socrates had neither the power to alter his beliefs nor to choose whether or not to act on them and so it makes sense to say that he was not free. This definition of the ‘self’ begs the question in favour of determinism and I do not accept it for two reasons: a) it goes against my intuition of freedom and there is data that points to a different explanation. My personal intuition is that I have a ‘second awareness’ (7) of my body and that this awareness allows me to reflect on and influence my thoughts, feelings and body. The following is evidence to support my intuition. In 1959 a Tibetan freedom fighter named Lobsang Tenzin was imprisoned and tortured under the invading Chinese army.(8) After escaping prison Tenzin developed the ability to raise his body temperature ten degrees while meditating and demonstrated these abilities under lab conditions in 1985.(9) I suggest that the best explanation for Tenzin’s psychophysical abilities is free will along the lines described above: biology and physics could explain the process of Tenzin’s body temperature rising but the cause seems to originate in Tenzin’s ‘mind’ as there is no outer cause - such as a heater - or instinctive one - such as arousal – and, as Tenzin taught himself to meditate, social conditioning is not a sufficient explanation. I believe this example adequately demonstrates my definition of a ‘self’ as a secondary awareness or ‘mind.’(10) This example also demonstrates my defintion of ‘free will’ - as the ability to be able to reflect on cause and effect in one’s ‘mind’ and thereby make genuine decisions within the bounds set by the laws of nature, in this case the decision to generate body heat .

My final argument against physical determinism is that as a philosophy of life is that it is useless. The claims for determinism as a philosophy to live by are based on the idea that all human behaviour can be predicted (theoretically) by the natural sciences. I do not believe that this is true and, even if it were it would lead to such absurdities that life as we know it would be impossible: for example, if it were true then someone could predict exactly how I will write this essay, print it out and give it to me before I even finish writing.(11) The ability to predict the rest of history (or to live as if we could) would, in my opinion, render life unbearably meaningless. I do, however, admit the epistemic possibility that hard physical determinism is correct and free will is an illusion but, as knowledge of the future would only be available to a mind of infinite size and ability the fact would be meaningless: even if we never really make any choices this theoretical knowledge would in no way change the way we perceive the world, would bring us no advantages and, if widely believed, would have negative results.(12) I also grant the possibility of a mind that is aware of everything past, present and future, but an ability to literally perceive the totality of existence is not the same as predicting it from first premises.(13)

In this essay I have tried to justify a different approach to Socrates’ death than that taken by Holbach and it is this: Socrates spent his life thinking about virtue and vice and so it is fair to assume that by the time he was imprisoned he probably had a good idea of what he believed and why. As he sat in his prison cell he would have had a lot to consider – no-one takes dying lightly – but, in the end, he had two options: to flee and abandon his beliefs or to act on those beliefs and stay. I believe that Socrates made a genuine decision to stand by his convictions and that Lobsang Tenzin’s psychophysical abilities provide evidence for the possibility of such genuine self-control.
I reject physical determinism’s claim that from data at Socrates birth one could predict his (or anyone’s) life and even if this possibility were proven I propose that it ought to be ignored for the sake of our species. As the debate on determinism is indecisive, I believe that we ought to reject Holbach’s position and its dehumanising consequences and accept that there are genuine choices to be made simply because an unsteady theory cannot topple a definite, living experience. If free will is an illusion then let us keep dreaming.

Notes:
(1) Baron Holbach, The Illusion of Free Will, in P. Edwards and A. Pap, eds., A Modern Introduction to Philosophy: Readings from Classical and Contemporary Sources, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957, pp. 323-324;
(2) Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, Englewood cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1992, p. 53;
(3) Baron Holbach, The Illusion of Free Will, in P. Edwards and A. Pap, eds., A Modern Introduction to Philosophy: Readings from Classical and Contemporary Sources, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957, p. 321;
(4) The defence put forth by Voltaire that criminals should still be punished but not blamed for their crimes presents difficulties - for example: if all murders are as necessary as one another then how can we distinguish between murder in self-defence and murder for financial gain? The very reason why these murders are considered different is free will: self-defence is necessary to retain one’s life whereas murder for financial gain is only necessary if one has chosen the ruthless pursuit of capital.;
(5) ibid;
(6) ibid, p. 317;
(7) This term is apparently used in neuroscience to describe self-consciousness though I have this only on hearsay.;
(8) H. H. the Dalai Lama and Victor Chan, The Wisdom of Forgiveness, Sydney, Hodder, 2004, pp. 69-73;
(9) This ability was demonstrated under lab conditions in a room kept at the temperature of a meat cooler, during the meditation Tenzin’s breathing dropped to five breaths per second.;
(10) The ‘mind’ referred to above is dependent on a fully functioning brain for its existence.;
(11) Despite how desirable this particular example is, the general implications are ridiculous eg. presenting a baby with the love letters he will write to his first girlfriend.;
(12) Eg. The loss of the concepts bravery, cowardice, virtue, vice, strong, weak, hope, love etc. leaving only necessary or neutral.;
(13) The idea that the future is perceived is not the same as saying it is determined as it implies a position outside time (eg. God) from which one can simply see what choices a person will make without predicting the outcome from first premises.

Well, there's my two cents...or maybe it's more.
K. F.